Stockpile Stewardship in the Russian Federation
E. Turpen, S. Kadner
With the U.S. moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and as a preliminary step toward ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was charged with the onerous responsibility of ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. A streamlined Energy and Defense Department, operating on greatly reduced budgets, must support the smaller, aging nuclear weapons' stockpile. Simultaneously, the DOE is required to maintain the ability to rapidly design, develop, and produce nuclear and non-nuclear components and systems, as required. Performance, reliability, responsiveness and affordability are all critical objectives of the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP). As the objectives and issues surrounding the U.S. nuclear complex and programs are generally well-known among persons involved with nuclear programs or issues, discussion of the Russian approach in stockpile stewardship begins with a brief comparison of U.S. and Russian complexes and objectives. The analysis of Russian nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship will utilize the U.S. approach as a baseline from which to explain and discuss the Russian nuclear program as it relates to achieving safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons without the luxury of actual testing.
This abstract was presented at the 32nd Annual Midyear Meeting, "Creation and Future Legacy of Stockpile Stewardship Isotope Production, Applications, and Consumption", Plenary Session, 1/24/1999 - 1/27/1999, held in Albuquerque, NM.